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Abstract. This paper presents a type system which guarantees that
well-typed programs in a procedural programming language satisfy a
noninterference security property. With all program inputs and outputs
classified at various security levels, the property basically states that a
program output, classified at some level, can never change as a result of
modifying only inputs classified at higher levels. Intuitively, this means
the program does not “leak” sensitive data. The property is similar to
a notion introduced years ago by Goguen and Meseguer to model secu-
rity in multi-level computer systems [7]. We also give an algorithm for
inferring and simplifying principal types, which document the security
requirements of programs.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a type system for a procedural language that guarantees
that well-typed programs respect the security levels of the variables they manip-
ulate. More precisely, it guarantees that well-typed programs are noninterfering,
which basically means that high-security inputs cannot affect low-security out-
puts. Goguen and Meseguer introduced the idea of noninterference years ago as
a notion of security for multi-level computing systems [7]; this papers applies
the notion to programming languages. Our type soundness theorem is a proof
that every well-typed program has the noninterference property. The proof de-
pends on two lemmas that, interestingly, turn out to be typing analogs of two
properties known for years within the security community as the simple security
property and the confinement property (also known as the ∗-property). These
are properties of the Bell and LaPadula model, developed in the early 70’s as a
model for multi-level security [4].
In an earlier work [17], we presented a type system to guarantee noninter-
ference in a simple imperative language. In this work, we extend the analysis to
a language with first-order procedures, which can be used polymorphically with
respect to security classes. Also, we address the type inference problem here.
We begin with an overview of the type system. Then we formally present
the system and prove its soundness relative to a standard natural semantics.
⋆ This material is based upon activities supported by the National Science Foundation
under Agreements No. CCR-9400592 and CCR-9414421.
In Section 6, we turn our attention to type inference and type simplification.
Finally, we sketch some related efforts and some future research directions.
2 An Overview of the Type System
Noninterference was introduced as a model of security for multi-level computing
systems [7]. The basic idea is that a system has users, some of whom supply
high-level inputs and others who supply low-level inputs. Low-level users are
only allowed to see low-level system outputs. (For the sake of simplifying the
discussion, we shall consider only two security levels, low and high.) Such a
system has the noninterference property if no matter how the high-level inputs
change, the low-level system outputs remain the same.
The idea can also be applied to programming languages. Intuitively, the
notion is that high-level program inputs can be altered without affecting any low-
level outputs. As a simple example, consider a procedure with just two formal
parameters x and y:
proc P(inout x : low , inout y : high);
Here x and y are treated as variables with security levels low and high respec-
tively. Suppose the calls P (u : low , v : high) and P (u : low , w : high) terminate
with some final values for u, v, and w. The final values of v and w may differ.
But if P is noninterfering, the final value of u will be the same in both cases.
Our type system guarantees that well-typed programs are noninterfering.
2.1 Types
The types of the system are stratified into three levels. There are the τ types,
which are the security levels, the π types, which are the types of expressions and
commands, and the ρ types, which are the types of phrases. The security levels
are assumed to be partially ordered by ≤. For example, one might have low ,
high, trusted and untrusted such that low ≤ high and trusted ≤ untrusted. The
relation ≤ is extended to a subtype relation ⊆ over the phrase types.
Our phrase types are similar those of Forsythe [12], except that our command
types are parameterized. A command type has the form τ cmd ; the intuition
behind it is that a command c has this type only if every assignment in c is to a
variable whose security level is τ or higher. So if a command has type high cmd ,
then it does not contain any assignments to low variables. Other phrase types are
the types of variables, written τ var , and the types of acceptors, written τ acc.
A variable of type τ var stores information whose security level is τ or lower. An
acceptor is a write-only variable, used to type the out parameters of procedures.
A variable is implicitly dereferenced, so there is a rule for converting τ var to τ .
Likewise, there is a rule for converting a variable type to an acceptor type, which
is necessary in the left sides of assignments and in procedure calls involving
out parameters. The subtype relation is contravariant in both command and
acceptor types.
2.2 The Core Language and Typing Rules
The typed language is a core imperative language with procedures; however,
procedures are not first class values. Inspired by Denning’s program certification
rules [6], we have developed typing rules that ensure noninterference.
For instance, suppose that l and h are variables and that the identifier typing
γ gives l type low var and gives h type high var . Then the assignment l := h
must be rejected, since a change in the initial value of h will affect the final value
of l. This is what Denning termed an explicit flow from h to l. So we introduce
the following typing rule:
γ ⊢ e : τ acc, γ ⊢ e′ : τ
γ ⊢ e := e′ : τ cmd
This rule requires variables l and h in our example to agree on their security
levels. Since they do not agree, even using subtyping, the assignment is rejected.
On the other hand, h := l is accepted. Since low ≤ high , we can coerce the type
of l from low to high to get agreement, allowing the assignment to be given type
high cmd . Alternatively, we can coerce the type of h from high acc to low acc
to give the assignment type low cmd .
It is worth pointing out that subtyping is neither covariant nor contravari-
ant in variable types, because a variable is both an expression (which behaves
covariantly) and an acceptor (which behaves contravariantly). Hence low var is
unrelated to high var .
As another example, suppose we try to copy h to l indirectly as follows:
while h > 0 do
l := l+ 1;
h := h− 1
od
Again the final value of l is affected by the initial value of h. This is what Denning
termed an implicit flow from h to l. Thus, the typing rule for while insists that
the guard and body of the loop be typed at the same security level:
γ ⊢ e : τ, γ ⊢ c : τ cmd
γ ⊢ while e do c : τ cmd
Determining whether a given program is noninterfering is, of course, unde-
cidable. As we shall see, our type system is a sound and decidable logic for
reasoning about the noninterference of a program. Therefore, it is necessarily
incomplete—some noninterfering programs are rejected by the type system.
2.3 Security Type Inference
Type inference in this setting attempts to prove that a program is noninterfering
and produces a principal type that succinctly conveys how the program can be
executed securely. A principal type is a constrained type scheme [13] with a
contraint set of flat subtype inequalities among security levels. Consider, for
instance, the following procedure that indirectly copies x to y:
proc (in x, out y)
letvar a := x in
letvar b := 0 in
while a > 0 do
b := b + 1;
a := a− 1;
y := b
(The construct letvar x := e in c allocates a local variable whose scope is c.)
One principal type for this procedure is
∀α, β with α ≤ β . β proc(α, β acc)
where α and β are type variables such that α corresponds to the security level
of x and β to the security level of y. A call to this procedure can be executed se-
curely provided that the arguments have security levels that, when substituted
for the bound variables of the type, satisfy the inequality. The call itself will
have type β cmd , as conveyed by β proc. In this sense, the procedure is poly-
morphic. The above principal type can be simplified to ∀β . β proc(β, β acc) due
to subtyping of procedure types. As a practical matter, it is very important to
simplify the inferred principal types by exploiting the antisymmetry of ≤ and
the monotonicities of the type constructors. Type inference and simplification
are discussed in detail in Section 6.
3 A Formal Treatment of the Type System
The syntax of the core imperative language is given below.
(Phrase) p ::= e | c
(Expr) e ::= x | n | l | e+ e′ | e− e′ | e = e′ |
e < e′ | proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c
(Comm) c ::= e := e′ | c ; c′ | e(e1, e2, e3) | while e do c |
if e then c else c′ | letvar x := e in c |
letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c
′
Meta-variable x ranges over identifiers, n ranges over integer literals and l ranges
over locations, which are used in our language for input and output: the initial
values of any locations in a program represent inputs, and the final values of the
locations represent outputs. (In addition, as will be seen in the natural semantics,
evaluating a letvar causes a new location to be allocated, and later deallocated.)
Also, we assume for simplicity that each procedure has exactly three parameters
(one of each kind), and we use 0 for false and 1 for true. Finally, a phrase is
closed if it has no free identifiers.
The types of the core language are stratified as follows:
τ ::= s
π ::= τ | τ proc(τ1, τ2 var , τ3 acc) | τ cmd
ρ ::= π | τ var | τ acc
Meta-variable s ranges over a set of security levels, which is partially ordered
by ≤. The rules of the type system are given in Figure 1. We omit typing rules
for some compound expressions since they are similar to rule (sum). Notice that
rule (int) allows an integer literal to be given every security level. Intuitively,
a value is never intrinsically sensitive—it is sensitive only if it comes from a
sensitive location. Note also that rule (letproc) allows procedures to be used
polymorphically. The remaining rules of the type system constitute the subtyping
logic and are given in Figure 2.
In the typing judgment λ; γ ⊢ p : ρ, meta-variable γ ranges over identifier
typings and λ over location typings. An identifier typing is a finite function
mapping identifiers to types of the form τ , τ var or τ acc; γ(x) is the type
assigned to x by γ, and γ[x : ρ] is a modified identifier typing that assigns type ρ
to x and assigns type γ(x′) to any identifier x′ other than x. A location typing is a
finite function mapping locations to τ types with similar notational conventions.
To facilitate the soundness proof, we introduce a syntax-directed set of typing
rules. The rules of this system are just the rules of Figure 1 with rules (ident),
(r-val), (assign), (if), and (while) replaced by their syntax-directed coun-
terparts in Figure 3. The subtyping rules in Figure 2 are not included in the
syntax-directed system. We write judgments in the syntax-directed system as
λ; γ ⊢s p : ρ. The benefit of the syntax-directed system is that the last rule used
in the derivation of a typing λ; γ ⊢s p : ρ is uniquely determined by the form of
p and of ρ. It is also helpful in determining where coercions are needed during
type inference.
Next we establish that the syntax-directed system is actually equivalent to
our original system with respect to the π types. First we need two lemmas:
Lemma1. If λ; γ[x : ρ′] ⊢s p : π and ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′, then λ; γ[x : ρ] ⊢s p : π.
Lemma2. If λ; γ ⊢s p : π and ⊢ π ⊆ π′, then λ; γ ⊢s p : π′.
Equivalence is now expressed by the following theorem:
Theorem3. λ; γ ⊢ p : π iff λ; γ ⊢s p : π.
From now on, we shall assume that all typing derivations are done in the
syntax-directed type system, and therefore shall take ⊢ to mean ⊢s .
4 A Natural Semantics
We give a natural semantics for closed phrases. A closed phrase is evaluated
relative to a memory µ, which is a finite function from locations to integers. The
(ident) λ; γ ⊢ x : τ γ(x) = τ
(var) λ; γ ⊢ x : τ var γ(x) = τ var
(acceptor) λ; γ ⊢ x : τ acc γ(x) = τ acc
(varloc) λ; γ ⊢ l : τ var λ(l) = τ
(int) λ; γ ⊢ n : τ
(r-val) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ var
λ; γ ⊢ e : τ
(l-val) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ var
λ; γ ⊢ e : τ acc
(sum) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ ⊢ e′ : τ
λ; γ ⊢ e+ e′ : τ
(compose) λ; γ ⊢ c : τ cmd , λ; γ ⊢ c′ : τ cmd
λ; γ ⊢ c ; c′ : τ cmd
(letvar) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ[x : τ var ] ⊢ c : τ ′ cmd
λ; γ ⊢ letvar x := e in c : τ ′ cmd
(assign) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ acc, λ;γ ⊢ e′ : τ
λ; γ ⊢ e := e′ : τ cmd
(if) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ ⊢ c : τ cmd , λ; γ ⊢ c′ : τ cmd ,
λ; γ ⊢ if e then c else c′ : τ cmd
(while) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ ⊢ c : τ cmd
λ; γ ⊢ while e do c : τ cmd
(procedure) λ; γ[x1 : τ1, x2 : τ2 var , x3 : τ3 acc] ⊢ c : τ cmd
λ; γ ⊢ proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c :
τ proc(τ1, τ2 var , τ3 acc)
(apply) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ proc(τ1, τ2 var , τ3 acc),
λ; γ ⊢ e1 : τ1, λ; γ ⊢ e2 : τ2 var , λ; γ ⊢ e3 : τ3 acc
λ; γ ⊢ e(e1, e2, e3) : τ cmd
(letproc) λ; γ ⊢ proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c : pi,
λ; γ ⊢ [proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c/x]c
′ : τ cmd
λ; γ ⊢ letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c
′ : τ cmd
Fig. 1. Rules of the Type System
contents of a location l ∈ dom(µ) is the integer µ(l), and we write µ[l := n]
for the memory that assigns n to location l, and µ(l′) to a location l′ 6= l; thus
µ[l := n] is an update of µ if l ∈ dom(µ) and an extension of µ if l 6∈ dom(µ).
Since expressions and commands are pure, our semantics uses µ ⊢ e⇒ n for
the evaluation of an expression and µ ⊢ c⇒ µ′ for the evaluation of a command.
Commands are nonexpansive in that dom(µ) = dom(µ′). We let µ− l stand for
µ with location l removed from its domain.
(base) τ ≤ τ ′
⊢ τ ⊆ τ ′
(reflex) ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ
(trans) ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′, ⊢ ρ′ ⊆ ρ′′
⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′′
(acc−) ⊢ τ ⊆ τ ′
⊢ τ ′ acc ⊆ τ acc
(cmd−) ⊢ τ ⊆ τ ′
⊢ τ ′ cmd ⊆ τ cmd




⊢ τ proc(τ1, τ2 var , τ3 acc) ⊆ τ
′ proc(τ ′1, τ2 var , τ
′
3 acc)
(subtype) λ; γ ⊢ p : ρ, ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′
λ; γ ⊢ p : ρ′
Fig. 2. Subtyping rules
(ident′) γ(x) = τ, τ ≤ τ ′
λ; γ ⊢ x : τ ′
(r-val′) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ var , τ ≤ τ ′
λ; γ ⊢ e : τ ′
(assign′) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ acc, λ; γ ⊢ e′ : τ, τ ′ ≤ τ
λ; γ ⊢ e := e′ : τ ′ cmd
(if′) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ ⊢ c : τ cmd , λ; γ ⊢ c′ : τ cmd , τ ′ ≤ τ
λ; γ ⊢ if e then c else c′ : τ ′ cmd
(while′) λ; γ ⊢ e : τ, λ; γ ⊢ c : τ cmd , τ ′ ≤ τ
λ; γ ⊢ while e do c : τ ′ cmd
Fig. 3. Syntax-directed typing rules
The evaluation rules are given in Figure 4. We write [e′/x]e to denote the
capture-avoiding substitution of e′ for all free occurrences of x in e. Note the
use of substitution in rules (call), (bindvar) and (bindproc); this allows us
to avoid environments and closures in the semantics.
5 Type Soundness as Noninterference
In this section, we establish the semantic soundness of our type system by proving
a noninterference theorem. Before proving soundness, we require some lemmas
that establish useful properties of the type system and semantics.
Lemma4 (Expression Substitution). If λ; γ[x : τ ] ⊢ p : ρ, then λ; γ ⊢
[n/x]p : ρ, and if λ; γ ⊢ l : ρ and λ; γ[x : ρ] ⊢ p : ρ′, then λ; γ ⊢ [l/x]p : ρ′.
(val) µ ⊢ n⇒ n
(contents) µ ⊢ l⇒ µ(l) l ∈ dom(µ)
(add) µ ⊢ e⇒ n, µ ⊢ e′ ⇒ n′
µ ⊢ e+ e′ ⇒ n+ n′
(sequence) µ ⊢ c⇒ µ′, µ′ ⊢ c′ ⇒ µ′′
µ ⊢ c ; c′ ⇒ µ′′
(branch) µ ⊢ e⇒ 1, µ ⊢ c⇒ µ′
µ ⊢ if e then c else c′ ⇒ µ′
µ ⊢ e⇒ 0, µ ⊢ c′ ⇒ µ′
µ ⊢ if e then c else c′ ⇒ µ′
(call) µ ⊢ e⇒ n, µ ⊢ [n, l, l′/x1, x2, x3]c⇒ µ
′
µ ⊢ (proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c)(e, l, l
′)⇒ µ′
(update) µ ⊢ e⇒ n, l ∈ dom(µ)
µ ⊢ l := e⇒ µ′[l := n]
(bindvar) µ ⊢ e⇒ n, l is the first location not in dom(µ),
µ[l := n] ⊢ [l/x]c⇒ µ′
µ ⊢ letvar x := e in c⇒ µ′ − l
(loop) µ ⊢ e⇒ 0
µ ⊢ while e do c⇒ µ
µ ⊢ e⇒ 1, µ ⊢ c⇒ µ′, µ′ ⊢ while e do c⇒ µ′′
µ ⊢ while e do c⇒ µ′′
(bindproc) µ ⊢ [proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c/x]c
′ ⇒ µ′
µ ⊢ letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c
′ ⇒ µ′
Fig. 4. The Evaluation Rules
Lemma5 (Simple Security). If λ; γ ⊢ e : τ , then for every l in e, λ(l) ≤ τ ,
and for every x free in e, γ(x) ≤ τ .
Lemma6 (Confinement). If λ ⊢ c : τ cmd, µ ⊢ c ⇒ µ′, dom(λ) = dom(µ),
and l is a location assigned to in c, then λ(l) ≥ τ or µ′(l) = µ(l).
Now we are ready to prove the soundness theorem.
Theorem7 (Noninterference). Suppose
(a) λ ⊢ c : π,
(b) µ ⊢ c⇒ µ′,
(c) ν ⊢ c⇒ ν′,
(d) dom(µ) = dom(ν) = dom(λ), and
(e) ν(l) = µ(l) for all l such that λ(l) ≤ τ .
Then ν′(l) = µ′(l) for all l such that λ(l) ≤ τ .
In the absence of procedures, this theorem can be proved directly [17]. Here,
however, we prove the Noninterference Theorem as a corollary to the following
theorem, whose proof is omitted due to space restrictions.
Theorem8. Suppose
(a) λ; [x1 : τ1, . . . , xk : τk] ⊢ c : π,
(b) µ ⊢ [n1, . . . , nk/x1, . . . , xk]c⇒ µ′,
(c) ν ⊢ [n′
1
, . . . , n′
k
/x1, . . . , xk]c⇒ ν′,
(d) dom(µ) = dom(ν) = dom(λ),
(e) ν(l) = µ(l) for all l such that λ(l) ≤ τ , and
(f) 6⊢ τi ≤ τ , for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Then ν′(l) = µ′(l) for all l such that λ(l) ≤ τ .
It is well known that polymorphic variables can easily break traditional forms
of type soundness [16]. The same is true of a security type system. Giving a
variable polymorphic type opens the door to “laundering”. It would be possible
to store high information and retrieve it as something low. But soundness can also
break in more subtle ways due to mutable objects, like variables and first-class
references, coupled with higher-order polymorphic procedures. It is interesting
to note that if the core language were extended with these features, then existing
techniques such as weak types [14] or limiting polymorphism to values [19] could
be used to preserve soundness.
6 Type Inference
For the sake of describing type inference in this setting, we need to introduce
extended types that can contain type variables (α, β,. . . ) in place of security
levels. We use metavariables τ̂ , π̂, and ρ̂ to range over extended types. Also, we
use γ̂ to range over extended identifier typings that map identifiers to extended
types; FTV (γ̂) gives the set of free type variables of γ̂.
A type inference algorithm W , defined by cases on the phrases of the lan-
guage, is given in Figures 5 and 6. It takes as input a location typing λ, an
extended identifier typing γ̂, a program phrase p, and a set V of type variables,
which represents the set of “stale” type variables; this allowsW to choose “fresh”
type variables as necessary. If it succeeds, then it returns a set of flat subtype
inequalities C, an extended type π̂, and an updated set V ′ of stale type vari-
ables. Note that the constraint τ̂ = τ̂ ′ abbreviates the two inequalities τ̂ ≤ τ̂ ′
and τ̂ ′ ≤ τ̂ .
We now establish the correctness of algorithm W . An instantiation I is a
mapping from type variables to (ordinary) τ types. It can be applied, in the usual
way, to extended types, to extended identifier typings, and to sets of inequalities
among extended types.
Lemma9. If FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V and (C, π̂, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, p, V ) succeeds, then V ′
contains all type variables in C, π̂, and V .
W (λ, γ̂, p, V ) = case p of
x : case γ̂(x) of
τ̂ : ({τ̂ ≤ α}, α, V ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V
τ̂ var : ({τ̂ ≤ α}, α, V ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V
default : fail
n : ({ }, α, V ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V
l : ({λ(l) ≤ α}, α, V ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V
e1 + e2 :
let (C1, τ̂1, V
′) = W (λ, γ̂, e1, V )
let (C2, τ̂2, V
′′) = W (λ, γ̂, e2, V
′)
in (C1 ∪ C2 ∪ {τ̂1 = τ̂2}, τ̂1, V
′′)
proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c :
let (C, τ̂ cmd , V ′) = W (λ, γ̂[x1 : α, x2 : β var , x3 : δ acc], c, V ∪ {α, β, δ})
in (C, τ̂ proc(α, β var , δ acc), V ′) α, β and δ 6∈ V
c1; c2 : let (C1, τ̂1 cmd , V
′) = W (λ, γ̂, c1, V )
let (C2, τ̂2 cmd , V
′′) = W (λ, γ̂, c2, V
′)
in (C1 ∪ C2 ∪ {τ̂1 = τ̂2}, τ̂1 cmd , V
′′)
if e then c1 else c2 :
let (C, τ̂ , V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V )
let (C1, τ̂1 cmd , V
′′) = W (λ, γ̂, c1, V
′)
let (C2, τ̂2 cmd , V
′′′) = W (λ, γ̂, c2, V
′′)
in (C ∪ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ {τ̂ = τ̂1 = τ̂2, α ≤ τ̂}, α cmd , V
′′′ ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V ′′′
while e do c :
let (C, τ̂ , V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V )
let (C′, τ̂ ′ cmd , V ′′) = W (λ, γ̂, c, V ′)
in (C ∪ C′ ∪ {τ̂ = τ̂ ′, α ≤ τ̂}, α cmd , V ′′ ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V ′′
e1 := e2 :
let (C, τ̂ ′, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e2, V )
case e1 of
x : if γ̂(x) = τ̂ var or γ̂(x) = τ̂ acc then
(C ∪ {τ̂ = τ̂ ′, α ≤ τ̂ ′}, α cmd , V ′ ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V ′
else fail
l : (C ∪ {λ(l) = τ̂ ′, α ≤ τ̂ ′}, α cmd , V ′ ∪ {α}) α 6∈ V ′
default : fail
letvar x := e in c :
let (C, τ̂ , V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V )
let (C′, τ̂ ′ cmd , V ′′) = W (λ, γ̂[x : τ̂ var ], c, V ′)
in (C ∪ C′, τ̂ ′ cmd , V ′′)
letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c
′ :
let (C, pi, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂,proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c, V )
let (C′, τ̂ cmd , V ′′) = W (λ, γ̂, [proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c/x]c
′, V ′)
in (C ∪ C′, τ̂ cmd , V ′′)
Fig. 5. Algorithm W
e(e1, e2, e3) :
let (C, τ̂ proc(τ̂1, τ̂2 var , τ̂3 acc), V
′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V )
let (C′, τ̂ ′, V ′′) = W (λ, γ̂, e1, V
′)
let C′′ = case e2 of
x : if γ̂(x) = τ̂ ′′ var then C ∪ C′ ∪ {τ̂ ′ = τ̂1, τ̂
′′ = τ̂2} else fail
l : C ∪ C′ ∪ {τ̂ ′ = τ̂1, λ(l) = τ̂2}
default : fail
in case e3 of
x : if γ̂(x) = τ̂ ′′ var or γ̂(x) = τ̂ ′′ acc then (C′′ ∪ {τ̂ ′′ = τ̂3}, τ̂ cmd , V
′′)
else fail
l : (C′′ ∪ {λ(l) = τ̂3}, τ̂ cmd , V
′′)
default : fail
Fig. 6. Algorithm W , continued
Theorem10 (Soundness). Suppose (C, π̂, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, p, V ) succeeds, and
I is an instantiation such that I(C) is true, and I(γ̂) and I(π̂) contain no type
variables. Then λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ p : I(π̂).
Proof. By induction on the structure of p. We show the most interesting case;
the other cases are similar and follow straightforwardly by induction.
Suppose (C, τ̂ cmd , V ′′) = W (λ, γ̂, letvar x := e in c, V ), I(C) is true and
I(γ̂) and I(τ̂ ) are closed. From W , we have C = C1 ∪C2 where
(C1, τ̂
′, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V )
and
(C2, τ̂ cmd , V
′′) = W (λ, γ̂[x : τ̂ ′ var ], c, V ′) .
Let I ′ extend I so that I ′(τ̂ ′) is closed. Clearly, I ′(γ̂) = I(γ̂) and I ′(τ̂ ) = I(τ̂ )
since I ′ extends I and I(γ̂) and I(τ̂ ) are closed. Further, I ′(C1) is true since
I(C) is true. So by induction, λ; I ′(γ̂) ⊢ e : I ′(τ̂ ′), or λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ e : I ′(τ̂ ′). Also,
I ′(γ̂[x : τ̂ ′ var ]) is closed and I ′(C2) is true, since I(C) is true. So by a second
use of induction, λ; I ′(γ̂[x : τ̂ ′ var ]) ⊢ c : I ′(τ̂ ) cmd . But I ′(γ̂[x : τ̂ ′ var ]) =
I ′(γ̂)[x : I ′(τ̂ ′) var ], so we have λ; I(γ̂)[x : I ′(τ̂ ′) var ] ⊢ c : I(τ̂ ) cmd . Therefore,
by rule (letvar), λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ letvar x := e in c : I(τ̂ ) cmd . ⊓⊔
Theorem11 (Completeness). Suppose λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ p : π and FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V .
Then (C, π̂, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, p, V ) succeeds and there exists an instantiation I ′ such
that I ′ extends I, except on variables in V ′ − V , I ′(C) is true, and I ′(π̂) = π.
Moreover, if W (λ, γ̂, p, V ) does not succeed, then it halts with fail.
Proof. By induction on the structure of p. We show two of the more interesting
cases, while and proc; the others are similar.
Suppose λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ while e do c : τ ′ cmd and FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V . Then, by rule
(while′), there is a type τ such that λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ e : τ , λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ c : τ cmd , and
τ ′ ≤ τ . So, by induction, (C, π̂1, V ′) = W (λ, γ̂, e, V ) succeeds, V ⊆ V ′, and there
exists an instantiation I1 such that I1 extends I, except on variables in V
′ − V ,
I1(C) is true and I1(π̂1) = τ . So π̂1 has the form τ̂1 and I1(τ̂1) = τ . And so π̂1
does not cause the first pattern match to fail.
Now FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V ′, and I1 and I agree on all variables in γ̂ since no type
variable in V ′−V is a member of γ̂. So λ; I1(γ̂) ⊢ c : τ cmd . By induction again,
(C′, π̂2, V
′′) = W (λ, γ̂, c, V ′) succeeds, V ′ ⊆ V ′′, and there is an instantiation I2
such that I2 extends I1, except on type variables in V
′′ − V ′, I2(C
′) is true and
I2(π̂2) = τ cmd . So π̂2 has the form τ̂2 cmd and I2(τ̂2) = τ . Thus, the second
pattern match succeeds and so does W (λ, γ̂,while e do c, V ), returning
(C ∪ C′ ∪ {τ̂1 = τ̂2, α ≤ τ̂1}, α cmd , V
′′ ∪ {α})
where α 6∈ V ′′. Now I2 extends I, except on variables in (V ′′ − V ′) ∪ (V ′ − V )
which is V ′′ − V since V ⊆ V ′ ⊆ V ′′ by Lemma 9. Let I ′ = I2[α := τ ′]. Then I ′
extends I except on variables in (V ′′−V )∪{α}, or (V ′′ ∪{α})−V since α 6∈ V .
Finally, we establish that I ′(C∪C′∪{τ̂1 = τ̂2, α ≤ τ̂1}) is true. By Lemma 9,
V ′ contains all type variables in C and in π̂1, so neither α nor any variable in
V ′′−V ′ is a member of C or π̂1. Thus I
′ and I1 agree on all type variables in C
and π̂1. So I
′(C) is true and I ′(τ̂1) = τ . Likewise, by Lemma 9, V
′′ contains all
type variables in C′ and π̂2. Since α 6∈ V ′′, I ′ and I2 agree on all type variables
in C′ and π̂2. So I
′(C′) is true and I ′(τ̂2) = τ . By the third hypothesis of rule
(while′), I ′(α) ≤ I ′(τ̂1) and we’re done.
Now suppose that
λ; I(γ̂) ⊢ proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c : τ proc(τ1, τ2 var , τ3 acc)
and FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V . Then by rule (procedure), we have
λ; I(γ̂)[x1 : τ1, x2 : τ2 var , x3 : τ3 acc] ⊢ c : τ cmd .
Let I1 = I[α := τ1, β := τ2, δ := τ3] where α, β, δ 6∈ V . Since FTV (γ̂) ⊆ V ,
then α, β, and δ do not occur in γ̂. So λ; I1(γ̂[x1 : α, x2 : β var , x3 : δ acc]) ⊢
c : τ cmd . Hence, by induction, W (λ, γ̂[x1 : α, x2 : β var , x3 : δ acc], c, V ∪
{α, β, δ}) succeeds, returning (C, π̂, V ′), V ∪ {α, β, δ} ⊆ V ′, and there exists an
instantiation I ′ such that I ′ extends I1, except on variables in V
′−(V ∪{α, β, δ}),
I ′(C) is true, and I ′(π̂) = τ cmd . So π̂ has the form τ̂ cmd and I ′(τ̂ ) = τ . Thus
the pattern match succeeds and so does
W (λ; γ̂,proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c, V )
returning (C, τ̂ proc(α, β var , δ acc), V ′). Now I1 extends I except on variables
α, β and δ. So I ′ extends I except on variables in (V ′−(V ∪{α, β, δ}))∪{α, β, δ}
which is V ′ − V since α, β, and δ are in V ′ but not V . ⊓⊔
It follows from these theorems that we can check whether p is typable with
respect to λ and γ by first runningW (λ, γ, p, ∅), and, if it succeeds with (C, π̂, V ),
then checking whether C is satisfiable with respect to the partial ordering of
security levels. Checking the satisfiability of a flat set of subtyping inequalities
with respect to a partial order has been studied previously [15, 18]. It is NP-
complete, in general, but can sometimes be done efficiently, for example, if the
partial order is a disjoint union of lattices.
6.1 Principal Types
In addition to checking typability, type inference gives us the ability to com-
pute principal types, that document all possible types of a program. We use
constrained quantification [13] for our principal types:
σ ::= ∀α¯ with C . π̂
In such a type scheme, the type variables α¯ can be instantiated only in ways
that satisfy the subtype inequalities in C.
The instances of a type scheme are defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Instance). ∀α¯ with C . π̂ ≻ π if there exists an instantiation
I whose domain is α¯ such that I(C) is true and ⊢ I(π̂) ⊆ π. In this case we say
that π is an instance of ∀α¯ with C . π̂.
Definition 13 (Principal Type). σ is a principal type for p with respect to λ
and γ if for all π, λ; γ ⊢ p : π iff σ ≻ π.
By the Soundness and Completeness theorems above, we can compute a
principal type for p with respect to λ and γ by running (C, π̂, V ) = W (λ, γ, p, ∅),
verifying that C is satisfiable, and forming the type scheme ∀α¯ with C . π̂, where
α¯ contains all type variables free in C or π̂. (Note that the definition of the
instance relation could in fact have required that I(π̂) = π; the weaker definition
was adopted to allow for more type simplification, as we discuss below.)
Here is an example of type inference. Calling W on the procedure given in
Section 2.3 produces the principal type
∀α, γ, ν, o, ǫ, ι, ζ, µ, δ, η, θ, κ, λ, β, ξ with{
α ≤ γ, ν = o, ǫ = ι, ν ≤ ǫ, ǫ = ζ, γ ≤ ǫ, ι = µ, δ = η, ι ≤ δ,
η = θ, δ ≤ η, γ = κ, µ ≤ γ, κ = λ, γ ≤ κ, β = ξ, o ≤ β, δ ≤ ξ
}
. ν proc(α, β acc)
Such a complex principal type obviously cannot serve as useful documentation to
a programmer. For this reason, it is necessary, as a practical matter, to simplify
the principal types produced by W .
6.2 Type Simplification
There is a natural notion of equivalence on type schemes: two type schemes are
equivalent iff they have the same set of instances. The idea of type simplification
is to replace a type scheme with a simpler, yet equivalent, type scheme. The type
simplifications considered in [13] can be applied directly here.
Often we can make deductions about how a type scheme ∀α¯ with C . π̂ can
be instantiated. For instance, suppose that C contains the inequalities α ≤ β
as well as β ≤ α. Since ≤ is a partial order, any instantiation that satisfies C
must instantiate α and β to the same type. Thus we can unify α and β. In
general, we can collapse the strongly-connected components of C. Performing
this simplification on the type scheme above yields the simpler principal type
∀α, o, δ, λ, ξ with {δ ≤ ξ, o ≤ λ, λ ≤ δ, α ≤ λ} . o proc(α, ξ acc)
We can further simplify type schemes by exploiting the monotonicities of
types. For example, o proc(α, ξ acc) is antimonotonic in α; that is, boosting α
produces a smaller type. Since the only constraint on α is that α ≤ λ, we can in-
stantiate α to λ, yielding a simpler principal type. Performing such monotonicity-
based instantiations repeatedly, we finally obtain the principal type
∀ξ . ξ proc(ξ, ξ acc)
which has no constraints at all. With type simplification, principal types become
useful documentation of the security requirements of programs.
7 Related Work and Future Directions
One of the earliest efforts in the area is Denning’s lattice model of secure in-
formation flow [5, 6]. Denning extended the work of Bell and LaPadula [4]
by giving a secure-flow certification algorithm for programs. This early work
has been followed by a variety of efforts dealing with secure information flow
[2, 8, 3, 10, 11, 17].
Some of these efforts [8, 10] have been aimed at proving the soundness of
Denning’s analysis. These efforts, however, prove soundness relative to an in-
strumented semantics whose validity is open to question. In contrast, we show
the soundness of our analysis with respect to a standard natural semantics.
The work of Banaˆtre et al. [3] is similar in spirit to our work. They give a
compile-time algorithm for detecting information flow in sequential programs,
and they justify their algorithm in terms of a noninterference property. Their
algorithm works by building a final accessibility graph indicating whether the
contents of one variable at some point in the program can flow into an instance of
a variable at some other point. The drawback here is that the number of vertices
in the final accessibility graph is at least linear in the size of the program.
This means that, unlike simplified principal types, final graphs cannot serve as
practical program documentation.
Palsberg and Ørbæk [11] give a type system for trust analysis in the simply-
typed λ calculus with a trust coercion. This (unsafe) coercion permits untrusted
values to be explicitly coerced to trusted values. However, subject reduction is
the only soundness property shown for their type system. It is unclear what one
can say about the soundness of their system in terms of secure information flow.
The trust coercion certainly rules out our noninterference theorem.
Another recent type-based approach is Abadi’s work on a version of the pi
calculus, called spi, extended to express cryptographic protocols [1]. Also related
is Necula and Lee’s recent work on proof-carrying code [9].
In the future, it would be desirable to extend the core language considered
here with a number of important features, including concurrency, networking,
and exception handling. The impact of such features on the noninterference
property needs to be investigated.
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